Research work
The Multiverse Paradox: Reductionism, Mathematics, and Existence as a Predicate
Dariusz Hasiak
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
Abstract
The multiverse hypothesis is often used to support a physicalist framework, offering a way to account for fine-tuning and modal facts without relying on abstract entities. This paper explores a potential methodological tension within this approach. Throughout its formulation including its generative equations, measures, and underlying symmetry groups, the framework appears to rely on the very mathematical structures it seeks to eliminate in the physicalist interpretation. A similar challenge may apply to single-universe models if the foundational properties ascribed to mathematics during research are set aside post factum. The analysis introduces a perspective for the philosophy of religion. On the standard Quinean view, existence is not a predicate but is carried by the quantifier: to say that something exists is to say that the bound variable ranges over it. Contemporary multiverse cosmology, however, treats physical existence as a feature selectively attached to elements of a prior mathematical space, most explicitly in Tegmark's Level IV multiverse, and in doing so quietly restores existence to the role of a first-order predicate. This is precisely the move the Quinean reading was meant to foreclose, and with it the Kantian critique of Anselm's ontological argument. The approach is strictly methodological, suggesting that contemporary physicalism faces subtle internal challenges that might be looked at in classic philosophical discussions. Read alongside the ontic structural realist reframing developed in The Limit of Logic, on which structure is ontologically prior to the distinction between mathematical and physical, the predicative use of existence in multiverse cosmology ceases to look like an isolated technicality and emerges as a recurring symptom of the same underlying commitment.