Research work · 2024
Ideas and Things
Henri Atlan, Inja Stracenski
Spinoza and Contemporary Biology
Abstract
In this chapter, the second movement of EIII2, from the mind to the body, is studied first, with a long scholium, because it is most counter intuitive in Spinoza’s time. (The first movement will be used in the following chapter). It begins by recalling Spinoza’s rejection of the idea that the mind can cause the body to act. It then explores recent neuroscientific data that establishes the temporal priority of physical changes in the brain over the conscious awareness of making a decision. Following this, it examines John Searle’s account of intentionality, concluding that Searle’s faith in the future demonstration of how the mind can cause the body to move is both vain and unnecessary from a Spinozist perspective. Taking up ideas about intentionality from Elisabeth Anscombe, it then introduces Atlan’s own model of an automaton that, on the basis of efficient causality alone, can come to act in a way that has all the properties of an intentional agent but without the need to impute to it any capacity for the mental, or intentional, causation of a physical change.