Research work · 2024
Conclusion
Henri Atlan, Inja Stracenski
Spinoza and Contemporary Biology
Abstract
This conclusion reiterates the main argument of the book—that Spinoza’s unique ontological monism grounds both thought and extension, or the mind and the body, in the one infinite substance, thereby guaranteeing their substantial unity, while at the same time affirming that they are distinct, with their own specific regimes of intelligibility, and that no causal relations can ever occur between them. Spinoza’s monism can thus accommodate either a physicalist or mentalist reductionism, so long as both are only methodological in nature and do not overstep their bounds into a metaphysical reductionism. Spinoza’s philosophy thereby helps resolve, by rearranging the terms of, the mind-body problem and allows contemporary cognitive and neuroscientific research to proceed, now shorn of illegitimate and unnecessary metaphysical misinterpretations.