Research work · 2026
Ordinary Language Philosophy
Routledge eBooks
Abstract
Like many other general labels, the title Ordinary Language Philosopher is often more of a hindrance than a help in identifying and characterising those to whom it is applied. In the first place, it seems to imply that what differentiates such philosophers from their’ contemporaries is that they are concerned with a whole new branch of philosophy, namely the philosophy of ordinary language, or that they conduct their philosophy solely in terms supplied by ordinary language, or both. This is misleading because, as we shall see, Ordinary Language Philosophy is concerned with standard and classical problems. The deliberate avoidance of formal notation is no more than a preference for certain gains which are, it is thought, made thereby. Second, the use of the general label suggests a commonality of line, a uniformity of theory and problems, which would be quite wrong. And yet the term does have some advantage. One thing that does link Ordinary Language Philosophers is an attitude towards philosophy itself, and particularly the goals it should aim for. They are extremely sceptical of all attempts to build large scale speculative systems based upon the universalising of categorial distinctions. They offer none themselves and are prone to think that philosophers would be more at home with the concrete and particular than they are with the general and abstract. The painstaking nature of their investigations and the patient accumulation of findings is in direct contrast to many other tendencies in recent philosophical history. The unity discerned in Ordinary Philosophy is mainly due to the fact that the two pre-eminent figures, Ryle and Austin, were contemporaries at Oxford. It is further encouraged by the preference which both shared for writing essays rather than books. Ryle produced only one book length work and several collections of papers. Austin published only a handful of lectures and papers. The limited output and the deliberate refraining from advocating general theories allows for the blurring of differences.