Research work · 2023

False start. Hegel’s article “The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy”

Anton А. Ivanenko

Philosophy of the History of Philosophy

Abstract

The article examines the intellectual disposition in German philosophy between 1794 and 1801, that is, in the period that closes the first strictly philosophical work of G. W. F. Hegel “The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy” (1801). The study presents, firstly, the position and the main achievements of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre since 1794 according to 1801, consisting in the discovery of (1) the nature of knowledge as the unity of subject and object, and, as a result, (2) the ideality of the object of knowledge, by virtue of this, (3) the identity of the beginning of knowledge and being, and therefore (4) in the consistent assertion of the object as a derivative of the ideal original of the illusion. Secondly, the movement of Schelling's thought in the same period from an apologetic position in relation to Wissenschaftslehre to the identity philosophy is traced. At first, Schelling seeks to preserve the reality of the object in the conditions of Fichte's discoveries by assuming that both the subject and the object have both an ideal and real nature, parallel to each other in their ideal reality (natural philosophy period). In the identity philosophy, Schelling directs his attention to the very unity of the so-conceived subject and object - he proceeds from the principle of the identity of subject and object as a source of ideal reality. Thirdly, the article demonstrates Hegel's position in the work “The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy” - the latter proceeds from the fact that Schelling, unlike Fichte, was able to overcome the opposites of consciousness, and therefore his philosophy of identity provides a strictly systematic derivation of the entire content of knowledge. However, fourthly, the analysis of the positions of Schelling and Hegel in 1801 shows the groundlessness of these statements, neither their proposed way of abstracting from the subjectivity of thinking, nor “intellectual intuition” are capable of giving rise to absolute knowledge. The latter circumstance leads Hegel to the need to develop in the next five years a method for removing the opposites of consciousness, resulting in a “Phenomenology of the spirit.”

DOI: 10.21638/spbu34.2023.110