Research work · 2026

Supply Chain Cybersecurity Through a Criminology Lens A Criminological Reinterpretation of Cybersecurity Governance

Elsevier BV

Abstract

Cybersecurity supply chain attacks have become one of the defining security challenges of the modern digital economy. Organizations increasingly depend on software vendors, cloud service providers, managed service providers, open-source software, hardware manufacturers, and other third-party technology partners whose compromise can cascade across entire ecosystems. Existing Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) frameworks, particularly those developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2022), provide comprehensive guidance for supplier governance, dependency management, and continuous monitoring. These frameworks are foundational, yet they interpret supply chain compromise primarily as a governance, compliance, and risk-management problem. This paper argues that C-SCRM can be productively complemented by a criminological perspective shaped by offender decision-making, target suitability, guardianship, networked victimization, and criminal adaptation. Rather than proposing a replacement for existing standards, it develops a criminological reinterpretation of cybersecurity governance, showing how established controls also function as implicit mechanisms of crime prevention. Drawing on Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), Cyber-Routine Activity Theory (Choi, 2008), Crime Script Theory (Cornish, 1994), Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 1997), and network perspectives on cybercrime victimization (Holt & Bossler, 2016), the study maps core C-SCRM practices onto criminological concepts and introduces the construct of criminological attractiveness — the degree to which a supplier presents a desirable opportunity from an offender’s perspective. The central contribution is stated as four testable propositions: that criminological attractiveness is partially independent of governance maturity; that trust functions as an opportunity structure as well as a defensive achievement; that localized hardening can displace rather than remove aggregate risk; and that supply-chain exposure is a network property rather than a sum of dyadic supplier assessments. Two documented campaigns — SolarWinds (espionage) and MOVEit (financially motivated cybercrime) — illustrate the propositions across differing offender motives. Building on these, the paper proposes a framework for Criminology-Informed Cybersecurity Governance (CICG) that complements governance with offender-oriented analysis, graph-based dependency modeling, and offender-opportunity scoring. Governance is primarily defenderoriented; criminology adds a complementary, offender-oriented explanatory layer. Cybersecurity governance becomes more analytically complete when defensive controls are understood not only as means of reducing organizational risk but also as interventions that reshape the opportunity structures available to cyber offenders.

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7029998