Research work · 2003

Rental of a durable good

Jacques Crémer, Cyril Hariton

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Abstract

Should a durable good monopoly facing agents with different length of demand allow only long term contracts?This paper studies an infinite horizon stationary model where a seller rents (or sells) every period of time one good.The number of potential buyers is constant and these buyers value the good differently according to the number of periods they need it (some want the good for only one period, some for two, e.g.).The profit maximizing and efficient allocation mechanism are derived when the monopoly commits to allocate the good for the whole length required by agents.These mechanisms exhibit the (endogenous) cost of committing to allocate the good for several periods, which does not allow the seller to benefit from potential high valuation buyers during these periods.Moreover, both mechanisms are compared and discussed.

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